Ideological distance and democratic decision making

Samenvatting

Our objective is to better understand and evaluate democratic collective choice procedures using the concept of ideological distance. A collective choice procedure (e.g., a political election system) aggregates the preferences of many individuals into a single collective preference. Ideological distance is the extent to which two individual preference rankings (of, say, the political parties) differ. We will use this concept of distance to study: (1) new collective choice rules that minimize the concessions individuals make with respect to their preferences, (2) the manipulation of elections by the misrepresentation of individual preferences and (3) the evolution of collective decision processes.

Output

Proefschrift

  • Beoogd: proefschrift
  • B Can(2012): Essays in Microeconomic Theory , Maastricht  1 februari 2012

Wetenschappelijk artikel

  • B Can, T Storcken(2012): Impossibilities with Kemeny updating Economics Letters pp. 229 - 231
  • B Can, T Storcken(2013): Update monotone preference rules Update monotone preference rules pp. 136 - 149
  • B Can(9999): Weighted distances between preferences Journal of Mathematical Economics pp. ---

Publicatie bedoeld voor een breed publiek

  • B Can(2014): Beleidsvorming in dynamische matchingmarkten pp. 58 - 61

Publieksinformatie

  • B. Can(2012): Essays in Microeconomic Theory

Kenmerken

Projectnummer

400-09-354

Hoofdaanvrager

Dr. K.G.M. Bosmans

Verbonden aan

Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics, Algemene Economie

Uitvoerders

Dr. B. Can, Dr. B. Can

Looptijd

15/09/2010 tot 16/04/2014