Ideological distance and democratic decision making

Summary

Our objective is to better understand and evaluate democratic collective choice procedures using the concept of ideological distance. A collective choice procedure (e.g., a political election system) aggregates the preferences of many individuals into a single collective preference. Ideological distance is the extent to which two individual preference rankings (of, say, the political parties) differ. We will use this concept of distance to study: (1) new collective choice rules that minimize the concessions individuals make with respect to their preferences, (2) the manipulation of elections by the misrepresentation of individual preferences and (3) the evolution of collective decision processes.

Output

Thesis

  • Beoogd: proefschrift
  • B Can(2012): Essays in Microeconomic Theory , Maastricht  February 1, 2012

Scientific article

  • B Can, T Storcken(2012): Impossibilities with Kemeny updating Economics Letters pp. 229 - 231
  • B Can, T Storcken(2013): Update monotone preference rules Update monotone preference rules pp. 136 - 149
  • B Can(9999): Weighted distances between preferences Journal of Mathematical Economics pp. ---

Publication meant for a broad audience

  • B Can(2014): Beleidsvorming in dynamische matchingmarkten pp. 58 - 61

Publications for the general public

  • B. Can(2012): Essays in Microeconomic Theory

Details

Project number

400-09-354

Main applicant

Dr. K.G.M. Bosmans

Affiliated with

Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics, Algemene Economie

Team members

Dr. B. Can, Dr. B. Can

Duration

15/09/2010 to 16/04/2014